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Hybrid Predictive Ensembles: Synergies Between
Human and Computational Forecasts
Lu Hong, PJ Lamberson, and Scott E Page*
Abstract: An increasing proportion of decisions, design choices, and predictions are being made by hybrid
groups consisting of humans and artificial intelligence (AI). In this paper, we provide analytic foundations that
explain the potential benefits of hybrid groups on predictive tasks, the primary use of AI. Our analysis relies
on interpretive and generative signal frameworks as well as a distinction between the big data used by AI and
the thick, often narrative data used by humans. We derive several conditions on accuracy and correlation
necessary for humans to remain in the loop. We conclude that human adaptability along with the potential for
atypical cases that mislead AI will likely mean that humans always add value on predictive tasks.
Key words: collective intelligence; predictive models; hybrid groups; big data; thick data

1

Introduction

In early 2017, floods devastated coastal Peru resulting in
power outages and loss of Internet service. In response,
Google, through its Project Loon, set sail a helium
balloon capable of providing stopgap Internet access. As
the balloon traversed its path from Puerto Rico to Peru,
the artificial intelligence guidance system repeatedly
steered the ballon from its course. Google’s human
engineers would intervene. Yet, as soon as they put the
AI back in control, the AI would go rogue. One moment,
it would head toward Uruguay. The next it would pivot
the ballon toward Venezuela. After a few iterations of
human–AI ping pong, the engineers realized that the AI
had discovered tacking, a pattern of zig-zagging to
exploit wind patterns used by sailors for centuries.
The lack of transparency and the potential novelty of
AI strategies of Boeing’s 737 Max airplanes suffer from
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a variety of design failures that can be traced to a poor
decision making protocol[1]. In scenarios involving
whether or not to raise or lower the nose of the plane,
Boeing’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation
System (MCAS) made decisions based on a single
sensor. In brief, to avoid an angle between wing and the
airflow too large (a dangerous combination), MCAS
would lower or raise the nose of the plane automatically.
In two crashes, that sensor was damaged, and MCAS
mistakenly lowered the nose of the plane. Each time the
human pilot raised the nose, the AI would again lower it.
The humans and the AI were playing a game of tug of
war not unlike the humans and the AI steering the Google
Balloon. In the case of the Boeing 737 Max airplanes,
different predictive models had tragic consequences[2].
These two examples call attention to a trend in which
more of the deciding, designing, creating, and predicting
involve hybrids of human and artificial intelligence. The
present and future of cognitive work will surely involve
a mangle of humans, algorithms, datasets, subjects,
objects, and domains[3, 4]. As they seek to understand the
world, these hybrid groups will also shape it[5, 6].
In this paper, we analyze the potential synergies
between humans and artificial intelligence. We focus on
a particular task: making accurate predictions. Our goals
are to provide some analytic foundations for the potential
wisdom and limits of hybrid crowds and to explore how
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the roles assigned to humans and AI within these hybrid
networks will likely shift and adapt in response to the
growing capabilities of AI[7, 8].
We have a variety of motivations for undertaking this
analysis. First, predictive tasks are ubiquitous. Many
marketing forecasts, stock market predictions, and
actuarial analysis are purely predictive, but a range of
other tasks that would previously have been classified as
decision making, problem solving, matching, design,
policy formulation, or guidance have been translated
into predictive tasks[9]. Essentially, any decision making
involves predicting the consequences of the available
options before choosing among them.
Second, a substantial proportion of high stakes
predictions, whether they involve hiring and admissions,
investments, inventory control, information acquisition,
pricing, or even prison sentencing, now rely on
assemblages of humans and algorithms. Understanding
the perils and promises of these assemblages and crafting
a proper balance between the two will be a major concern
moving forward.
Third, advances in AI have transformed the practice
of prediction. As recently as a few decades ago,
prediction — be it in the intelligence community,
business, and even science — relied on a combination
of experience, small amounts of data, and gut instinct.
Massive increases in computational power, deeper and
broader datasets, and the development of new algorithms
have increased both classification accuracy and the
length of forecasting windows. Weather forecasts that
were hit or miss two days forward now predict with high
accuracy a week in advance. The increased accuracy
resulting from the application of evermore powerful
algorithms to ever larger datasets, begs the question:
should humans remain in the predictive arena at all, or
should we leave prediction to algorithms entirely? Some
take the position that models based on data should have
replaced humans long ago. One does not need AI to best
humans. Even linear models tied to data outperform
human forecasters[10].
Fourth, mature literatures in psychology, statistics,
and computer science enable the formulation of precise
technical claims that can be linked to the actualities of
wetware, software, and data sources. Recent pushback
against “big data” in favor of “thick data” allows us to
connect the technical literature with critical
contemporary questions[11]. Among them include: Can
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we trust AI? What if HAL goes rogue? Can AI be biased?
As data become bigger, does that limit interpretive
flexibility?
Algorithms offer many advantages over people. Most
notably, they can handle far more data, make much
larger calculations, and they do not make mathematical
error. And, despite, in some cases, being designed to
mimic human cognition and the fact they encode, either
explicitly or implicitly, human representations and
assumptions about the world, algorithms do not suffer
from some of the most common cognitive biases, such
as anchoring, availability, and representativeness. Thus,
AI proves far better when given high dimensional
datasets that exceed human capacities such as gene
identification. With enough data, AI performs as well as
humans even in seemingly qualitative domains, such as
identifying high performing job applicants[12, 13].
We do not mean to imply that algorithms do not suffer
from biases. They do. Most troubling, biases can be
embedded in training data. For example, a corporation
might give an AI algorithm data on the career success of
every employee, e.g., internal year end evaluations,
external measures of success, and promotion history,
and intend to use AI to predict high potential hires. If
those data come from a world biased in favor of men,
AI will predict that men have higher potential. The
algorithm learns and amplifies the bias[14–16].
To give a specific example of this phenomenon,
Amazon abandoned a hiring algorithm that penalized
applicants who attended women’s colleges and that also
attached negative weight to the word “woman” in
applications. The data the algorithm relied on to make
predictions came from a work force that was 60% male
and whose upper management was 74% male. The key
takeaway is not that the algorithm’s computations were
biased, but the algorithm was trained on biased data.
Relatedly, data can be missing dimensions, or encoded
in particular ways that produced biased outcomes. Data
on salaries may not include whether a person’s partner
works for the same organization. If that percentage is
high, as is the case for some universities and medical
centers in non urban settings, the algorithm could make
biased inferences about the effect of marital status. More
generally, the features fed to an algorithm, what was left
in and what was left out, may well introduce bias.
Finally, algorithms can either restrict structural
representations as would be the case with a linear
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predictor or allow for nearly any interaction as is the case
with deep learning algorithms. Both can produce biases.
Linear predictors cannot identify intersectional
discrimination –
penalties for being from an
underrepresented racial group and a woman. Deep
learning algorithms can create bias by creating joint
categories, such as Skidmore alumni and Pre-1970,
which would be a proxy for gender.§
Our focus in this paper is less on the differences in
biases than the fundamentals of how humans approach
predictive tasks differently than AI. We rely on thicker,
more nuanced understandings that we often embed
within narratives. We can speculate on nontrivial
alternative futures, something AI cannot do very well.
Humans also take into account the ethical dimensions of
a decision based on a prediction. We may be less likely
to send seventeen year old teenagers to prison even if the
likelihood they commit another crime is high. We also
notice biases in outcomes along dimensions that might
not have been explicitly included. People would note
that an algorithm only selected women or white men.
Of course, people themselves suffer from innumerable
biases and ethical lapses. Thus, AI can check on our
biases, while we can question the potential narrowness
of AI. Given that AI and humans offer distinct strengths
and weaknesses, the practical question becomes how to
combine them to make hybrid predictions. Ideally,
hybrid predictions would exhibit the strengths of
powerful algorithms applied to big data with human
intuition applied to thick descriptive narratives[11]. Or,
we use the more popular phrasing: to make thick data
synergistic with big data[17]. Here, we take a multi-model
approach to sketch a logic for how that might be
accomplished[18].
Key to our analysis will be the observation that thick
data predictions differ in form and style from big data
predictions. Given that diversity, the combination
should be more accurate than the parts. That is not a new
insight. Scholars going back to Aristotle understood that
diversity underpins collective wisdom[19, 20]. Two heads
can be better than one whether they are the heads of
people or the less sophisticated heads of ants, bees, or
fish[21]. However, diversity offers no guarantees; two
heads can also perform worse. One key lesson from
studying ensembles of predictive algorithms has been
that using techniques like boosting and bagging to create
§

Skidmore was an all women’s college until 1971.
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synergistic diversity enhances ensemble accuracy[22].
Thus, not any diversity will do, the best ensembles must
be constructed thoughtfully. That same logic surely
holds for hybrid groups of humans and AI.
To sort how and why hybrid assemblages can be more
accurate, we rely on two mathematical frameworks for
modeling prediction: generated and interpreted
signals[23]. Generated signals are the standard
formulation in economics, statistics, and finance. Any
one person’s or algorithm’s prediction is represented as
a random variable whose value is conditioned on the
value of the outcome. That random variable is
characterized by a bias as well as an amount of variation.
The bias corresponds to the error that would arise given
the person’s way of thinking if they had all relevant
information. The variation corresponds to the
differences that arise from having particular sets of
information or experiences. Pairs of predictions, people
and algorithms in this case, also exhibit some degree of
correlation.
Interpreted signals come from computer science. The
framework assumes an underlying feature space that
embeds the set of all possible states along with an
outcome function that maps states to values. Predictors,
human or algorithm, partition the state space into
equivalence classes and assign values to each class. In
this framework, people differ from one another and from
algorithms in how they partition the states of the world
and how they map sets in their partitions to numerical
values or categories.
Our approach consists of two steps. First, using the
micro-level detail of the interpreted signal framework,
we sketch an informal claim that as data increase and
encompass more of what humans use to make
predictions, and as predictive algorithms become more
sophisticated, those predictions from AI will become
both more accurate and more correlated with human
predictions. We refer to this as the accuracy-correlation
effect (ACE). We also differentiate between typical and
atypical cases, with the later being instances in which
past data may not be relevant to the prediction at hand.
Given those constructs, we then apply the generated
signal framework to draw inferences about how humans
and algorithms combine. We rely on two theorems: the
diversity prediction theorem and the bias variance
decomposition theorem. Using these theorems, we can
calculate the relative contributions of humans and AI
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based on their accuracy and correlation as well as the
optimal weights to put on each. Though humans always
add accuracy at the margin, the optimal weight attached
to humans decreases as AI improves. For typical cases,
given the accuracy-correlation effect, in the future we
should expect humans to add little to accuracy and
receive little weight.
Past, though, need not be prologue. Some predictions
and classifications include new dimension or features.
A shock, such as a pandemic or housing crash, may
produce a qualitative disruption. Here, we find that if
people (or algorithms) can predict when algorithms will
make large mistakes with a reasonable degree of
accuracy, then the added value of humans may be quite
large. If people and algorithms cannot perform this type
of meta-prediction, then humans add less value.
In the discussion at the end of the paper, we
contemplate strategic predictive model choice.
Specifically, we consider the possibility that humans
adapt their predictive models, and the thick data they
gather, in response to the algorithms. Humans may seek
out thick data that differ as much as possible from the big
data used by algorithms, thus avoiding or reducing the
accuracy-correlation effect. The result will be more
accurate hybrid predictions, the continued value of
humans as part of hybrids, and more support for the idea
of an adaptive assemblage making sense of the world.
We also briefly discuss the potential gains from hybrids
consisting of crowds of people and ensembles of
algorithms.

2

Background: Human Prediction and Rise
of AI

Making accurate predictions has long been an important
skill whether engaged in politics, running a business, or
waging war. In the information age, predictive ability
has even greater currency. While nearly everyone is
aware of how advances in information technology have
altered our lives directly — we now have smart phones,
smart appliances, self driving cars, and an ever growing
Internet of Things – people are less aware of how much
of that impact relies on predictive algorithms. Almost
every aspect of our modern lives has been impacted by
the use of predictive algorithms applied to big data.
Predictive AI informs product attributes from the color
of clothing to the length of songs, political platforms,
medical treatments, parole decisions, hiring protocols,

building designs, and advertising content. Algorithms
that guide self-driving cars and auto-pilot planes,
allocate inventory across stores, detect email spam and
cancerous tumors, recommend life partners, and
translate words to text, also rely on prediction at their
core. Enhanced algorithmic predictive accuracy enables
us to plan further ahead, choose more wisely among
alternatives, allocate resources more efficiently, invest
in the technologies and cures most likely to improve
society, and more precisely to target advertisements and
information.
Prediction, therefore, receives substantial attention
from the academy. Formal studies of prediction span
multiple disciplines ranging from finance to politics to
medicine and psychology. We make no attempt at a full
survey of this vast interdisciplinary collection of
literatures here. Instead, we call attention to five points
of consensus.
First, success at prediction involves disciplined
thought. The most accurate predictors rely on multiple
models and frameworks, ground their forecasts in data,
and follow protocols that eliminate biases[24]. Second,
given that prediction requires multiple skills and
experience, people differ in their capacity as
forecaster[25]. Who predicts most accurately in any
context will vary, but predictive ability does transfer. An
expert at predicting the stock market may not be good at
predicting outcomes of sports contests but they will
probably be better than average. Third, predictive ability
can be taught. Learning to assign base rates, avoiding
biases, and considering multiple scenarios all improve
accuracy.
Fourth, groups predict more accurately than
individuals, and select groups fare better than large ones.
Though popular writers speak of the wisdom of crowds,
evidence suggests that a handful of top forecasters
perform better than an average of the entire crowd[26].
The finding that small groups predict better than
individuals extends to algorithms. A central takeaway
from prediction contests has been that ensembles of
algorithms have greater accuracy than individual
algorithms.
The logic underlying the increased accuracy of groups
and ensembles rests on a double application of statistical
reasoning. If biases are drawn from a distribution with
mean zero (a strong assumption), then given a set of
biased predictors, the average bias across that set will be
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3

Contributions of Big and Thick Data

We now describe some analytic foundations for
understanding the relative contributions of algorithms
applied to big data and humans using thick data in
making predictions. We begin with the interpreted
signal framework which conceptualizes prediction as
estimating an outcome function
As an example, suppose that we want to predict the
future performance of a professional quarterback or a
college dean. The state space (feature space) of an NFL
quarterback might include their college and pro statistics
as well as measurable physical, psychological, and
social attributes. Over years of experiences, coaches and
talent scouts hone their estimate of how these attributes
signal a future success or failure. For a potential dean,
relevant attributes might include past experiences,
management style, an ability to manage budgets and
crises,
and
communication
skills.
Faculty,
administrators, and hiring consultants all make
predictions about the likely impact of a candidate based
on these attributes. Those predictions differ because
humans rely on different logics[29]. They apply different
criteria and weight similar criteria differently.
Algorithmic predictions also rely on models applied to
features. Those features are most often represented in

numerical form – a much easier task when evaluating
quarterbacks than deans, but they can also build
predictions from qualitative inputs. Two algorithms that
learn differently from data, e.g., a random forest and a
neural net, will predict differently because they construct
different approximations of the true outcome function.
Humans and algorithms, because they encode and learn
differently, will also make different predictions.
The formal construction assumes a set of possible
states of the world, X , thinks of these as instances or
cases, along with an outcome function F that assigns a
real value to each state. An algorithm, C , and human, H ,
each possesses interpretations that partition those states
of the world X into categories (disjoint sets). These
partitions are called interpretations . For each set, the
algorithm or human assigns a value or a class. An
interpreted signal is therefore a mapping from each state
of the world to a set and then the assigning of a value
(or class) to each.
Put simply, humans and algorithms are assumed to
have predictive models that map each set in their
partition to a value or a truth status. A human that
partitions X into N sets, {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S N } would then
predict a value V(S i ) that it assigns to each point x in the
set S i .
Using this formalization we can distinguish between
big data and thick data that will be foundational to what
follows. By big data, we mean datasets that are both
granular (Fig. 1 ): They include multiple attributes for
each case, as well as large, they consist of multitudes of
cases or time periods. Data providing the DNA sequence
of a single individual are granular but not large. Data
showing whether each of ten million Florida registered
voters cast a ballot in an election include lots of cases but
are not granular. Data showing credit card purchases for
everyone in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania for 2014−2017 are
both granular and large in size. They satisfy both criteria
to be big.

# Attributes
Size
Granularity

Fig. 1

# Case or periods

less, on average, than a random selection from it.
A similar logic applies to variation. Assuming
variations in predictions have similar magnitude, then
the average of multiple draws will have less variation
than a single random draw. In sum, averaging multiple
predictors reduces bias and variation.
Finally, predictive tasks vary in their difficulty. At one
extreme, we may know the set of possible outcomes and
have accurate priors with tight ranges on the
probabilities. This is the case for outcomes of elections,
scores of sporting events, and the likelihoods of cancers
from radiological tests. Predictors in these cases
confront favorable signal to noise ratios, and seeing the
future can be relatively easy[27]. At the other extreme,
we can confront deep uncertainty: We do not know the
set of possible outcomes, the set of possible future
courses of action, or their likelihoods[28]. Thus, any
claims that AI can predict the repercussions of
international incidents or the spread of a pandemic such
as COVID with high fidelity should be viewed with
skepticism.
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Unlike big data, which consist of (many) discrete
attributes and many observations of those attributes,
thick data can be thought of as richer and more
qualitative, but as consisting of relatively fewer cases.
To return to our example of NFL quarterback prospects,
big data would consist of many statistics such as pass
attempts, yards per attempt, completion percentage,
touchdowns, interceptions, touchdown passes, etc. for
many previous quarterback prospects as well as data on
their subsequent performance in the NFL.
Thick data have a continuous, narrative nature, such
as is the case for this evaluation of a draft prospect’s
performance during the 2007 NFL combine: “ He was
smooth and fluid, yet quick and strong. Thomas wasted
no motion, keeping the parts of him that were not moving
calm and composed. His technique was excellent, and he
really looked like a grown man playing with college
kids.”[30]
We illustrate the distinction between big and thick data
in Fig. 2. Each row is an observation and the horizontal
axis represents X , the set of attributes that determine
outcomes. As shown in Fig. 2 , big data used by
algorithms and thick data used by humans differ in two
fundamental ways. First, algorithms handle many more
observations than people. Algorithms can read in
thousands, millions, or even billions of cases of high
dimensional data. A human’s experiences may be
limited to a few dozen cases or perhaps a hundred cases.
But humans also have potentially richer representations
of those cases.
The relative contributions to predictive accuracy of
big and thick data within a hybrid group depend on
characteristics of the outcome function. That is to say,
which data source is more effective, as well as how they
might work in tandem to provide accurate predictions,
depend on how attributes map to outcomes as shown
through various cases in Fig. 3.

Observation

Big data

Thick data

Attribute

Fig. 2

Distinction between big and thick data.

As can be seen from Fig. 3, both big data and thick data
may fail to capture some of the attributes that impact
outcomes. However, they tend to do so in different ways.
Because big data are discrete, they can only cover a finite
number of attributes. This has less of an effect on
prediction when either only a finite number of attributes
actually affect outcomes and the data capture most of the
relevant attributes, or when the outcome function is
relatively tame so that the impact of unobserved values
can be accurately extrapolated from observed attributes.
The top row of Fig. 3 depicts the latter case. Thick data
that capture attributes in a continuous way, may omit
ranges of the feature space.
The bottom row of Fig. 3 depicts a complex outcome
function. In this case, big data accurately approximate
the impact of some attributes, but miss other important
factors by a wide margin. Predictions based on thick data
are more likely to anticipate discontinuities or sudden
jumps. This is because a person may possess a mental
model that predicts a tipping point, where the value of
a single attribute causes a major change in the
outcome[31].
As an example, consider an applicant for a
mathematics PhD program. Big data might contain all
of a student’s grades and standardized test scores, while
thick data might be based on recommendation letters and
an interview. A comment made in a letter “ in recent
weeks, she has made exceptional progress on a major
unsolved problem in mathematics” might cause a
different reaction to a human evaluator than to an
algorithm which scores the letter on a scale from one to
ten.
At the moment, thick data approaches may be better
at capturing discontinuities —factors that have a large
impact on outcomes that are not well approximated by
other nearby attributes —while big data are better at
including a large set and wider range of characteristics.
These differences provide a hint that big data and thick
data working together will produce more accurate
collective predictions. Thick data can catch and draw
attention to constellations of factors that night slip
through the cracks between separated big data variables.
Even though big data cast a wider net, that net contains
holes. Ethnographers have long made similar arguments.
A deep engagement involving the full repertoire of
human senses, walking in another person’s shoes,
produces a richer understanding.

Fig. 3

Effect on outcome

Effect on outcome

True effect on outcome
Big data attributes
Thick data attributes

Observed by big data
Missed by big data

Attribute X
(e)
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Observed by thick data
Missed by thick data

Attribute X
(c)

Effect on outcome

Attribute X
(b)

Attribute X
(a)

Attribute X
(d)

Observed by big data
Missed by big data

Effect on outcome

True effect on outcome
Big data attributes
Thick data attributes

Effect on outcome

Effect on outcome
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Observed by thick data
Missed by thick data

Attribute X
(f)

Trend of how big and thick data can fail to capture effects.

Another strength of big data relative to thick data
becomes clear when we consider how algorithms and
humans make use of information contained in data. Both
algorithms and humans use data on past outcomes to fit
a predictive model for future outcomes. Error in these
models can be decomposed into three components: bias,
variance, and irreducible error.
Irreducible error is variability inherent in the outcomes
that cannot be eliminated by any model, human or
machine. Bias is error resulting from a difference
between the functional form of the prediction and the
true relationship between attributes and outcomes. For
example, if the true outcome function, F , is quadratic and
an algorithm allows for only linear functions, the
algorithm’s predictions will be biased. Increasing the
space of possible functions that an algorithm can fit
reduces bias as one of those functions may be closer to
F . This increase in model complexity comes at a cost; as
the model becomes more complex, parameter estimates
become more sensitive to the specifics of past
observations inducing the third source of error, variance.
When trained on more and larger datasets, algorithmic
predictions exhibit low variance. Algorithmic predictors,
like random forests and neural nets, possess almost
limitless flexibility, so the amount of variance and how
to balance it against bias become a choice variable rather
than a constraint.

Human predictors suffer from the same trifecta of
errors, but their relative contributions differ. The
flexibility that humans possess in our mental models can
reduce bias, but this flexibility along with the small
number of cases we observe make overfitting a concern.
As we construct more elaborate models in our head, we
are less able to apply them to unfamiliar settings,
resulting in potential bias. Human predictions also have
substantial noise — they depend on mood, time of day,
and even the weather – which may be an even larger
source of error than bias[32].
We can now apply this framework to see the impact
of increasingly large datasets and more powerful
algorithms. Clearly, these changes increase the accuracy
of algorithms, but more important to our study of hybrid
groups, as big data include more cases and attributes,
correlations change. If, for example, there were no
overlap in the dimensions considered by humans and
algorithms, then predictions of algorithms and humans
might be negatively correlated. In fact, in the special case
of binary classifications, interpreted signals with non
overlapping dimensions imply negative correlation[23].
As algorithms consider higher dimensional data, it
likely overlaps more with the thick data used by humans
as shown in Fig. 4 . As the overlap increases, the
correlation of the classifications should also become
more positive. We refer to this as the accuracy-
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Thick data
ErrorPredict

Big data

ErrorAtypical

Thick data
Atypical

Predictable

Thick data

Thick data
Big data

Fig. 5 Predictable and atypical cases given big data (and
classification errors).
Fig. 4 Increased overlap causing the accuracy-correlation
effect.

correlation effect (ACE).
ACE: As datasets become bigger, containing more
cases and having more granularity, algorithmic
predictions become more accurate and, if the overlap
with thick data increases, it is more correlated with
human predictions.
As we show formally in the next section, the accuracycorrelation effect greatly diminishes both how much
humans contribute to accuracy and how much weight
should be given to human predictions within a hybrid
group.
3.1

Predictable and atypical cases

Many predictive tasks include cases in which context
differs only marginally from the cases covered by big
data and, in many cases, thick data. An example of a
marginal change would be a shift in tax policy or
environmental standards. In these cases, algorithms
should outperform humans. However, cases can also be
qualitatively different. Qualitative change would
include natural disasters, financial meltdowns, new laws
– for example, a requirement that all cars be electric by
a certain date – and innovations.
Qualitative changes can, but need not, make past data
irrelevant. We can distinguish between cases that are
predictable given data and those in which existing data
are not informative as predictors, i.e. atypical cases. We
will assume that humans make more accurate
predictions than algorithms in atypical cases because we
can reason from analogy, imagine alternative futures,
and understand causal mechanisms.
The existence of atypical cases introduces a metapredictive task, namely, determining whether an
instance is predictable from data or not. Figure 5
partitions the set of all cases into two regions:

predictable and atypical . Each region contains a
subregion. Within the set of atypical cases, there exists
a set of cases thought to be predictable (ErrorAtypical ), and
within the set of predictable cases, there exists a set of
cases thought to be atypical (ErrorPredict).
3.2

Human + algorithm predictors

We analyze the potential value of hybrid predictions
involving humans and algorithms using a generated
signal framework. Our analysis relies on two wellknown mathematical identities. The first, the diversity
prediction theorem states that the crowd’s squared error
equals the average individual squared error minus the
diversity (variance) of the predictions. Suppose that the
true value of an unknown quantity equals V and that there
exists a collection of predictions denoted by si for i
equals 1 to N . Let s̄ equal the mean of these N predictions.
Diversity Prediction Theorem (crowd error equals
average error minus diversity):
1∑
1∑
(si − V)2 −
(si − s̄)2 .
N i=1
N i=1
N

( s̄ − V)2 =

N

We now apply this theorem to the special case of
predictions of a single numerical value by a human (h)
and by an algorithm (c ). In what follows, we assume that
the algorithm is more accurate than the human and,
without loss of generality, that the human predicts a
larger value (h > c). (This second assumption makes it so
that we do not have to consider multiple cases.) Then the
equation can be rearranged to the following.
Half the Distance Rule: Given an outcome value V ,
the average of a human, h, and an algorithmic prediction,
c , will be more accurate than the algorithm, if the squared
error of the human minus the squared error of the
algorithm is less than half the distance between the
human’s and algorithm’s predictions,
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(h − V)2 − (c − V)2 <

(h − c)2
.
2

The previous rule can be restated in terms of relative
accuracy, where accuracy is defined as the inverse of the
squared error. A squared error of ten corresponds to an
accuracy of one-tenth. Define Θ > 1 to be accuracy of the
algorithm relative to that of the human. If Θ = 3, this
means that the humans squared error equals three times
the squared error of the algorithm. We can then restate
the Half the Distance Rule as follows.
Three Times Better Rule: If the algorithm and
human are equally like to err in the same or opposite
directions, then the algorithm alone will be more
accurate than an average of the human and the algorithm
if and only if the algorithm is at least three times more
accurate.
We first assume that the human and the algorithm are
equally likely to err in the same direction or in the
opposite direction. The expected squared error for the
simple average of the human and the algorithm then
equals follows (α below denotes the sqaure root of θ):
]
1 2
1[
(α + 1)(c − V)2 − (α + 1)2 + (α − 1)2 (c − V)2 =
2
8
2
α +1
(c − V)2 .
4

This expression is less than the algorithm’s squared
error, (c − V)2, if and only if α2 < 3.
Notice that the Diversity Prediction Theorem does not
explicitly include bias and correlation, though they enter
implicitly through the diversity term. To make the
effects of bias and covariation explicit, we can invoke the
Bias-Variance Decomposition Theorem. Keep in mind
that when using the generated signal framework, we
represent each prediction, whether by human or
algorithm, as a random variable.
A random variable’s bias corresponds to the expected
difference of the mean of that variable from the mean of
the variable of interest. If on average, someone
predicting electoral outcomes overstated the democratic
party vote by 3%, then that person would have a bias of
0.03. For each pair of predictors, we can compute their
covariance: the expected value of the product of each
prediction from its mean. Two predictors with positive
covariance generally err in the same direction and will
be less accurate than two predictors with negative
covariance.
The Bias-Variance Decomposition Theorem states
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that the expected error of an average of random variables
(representing predictions) equals their average bias plus
their average variance plus their average pairwise
covariance. As above, let s̄ denote the average of the N
predictions, s1 to sN , and V denote the true value. Assume
the average bias equals Bias(s), the average variance
equals Var(s), and the average pairwise covariance
equals Cov(s)
Bias-Variance Decomposition Theorem: Expected
error equals average bias plus average variance plus
sample covariance,
(
)
1
1
E[( s̄ − V) ] = Bias(s) + Var(s) + 1 −
Cov(s).
N
N
2

2

In the case consisting of one human h and algorithmic
predictor c , the equation can be written as
(
)2 
 h + c

E 
− V  =
2

(Bias(h) + Bias(c))2 Var(h) + Var(c) Cov(h, c)
+
+
.
4
4
2

The previous expression can be difficult to interpret.
To build intuition, assume neither the human nor the
algorithm has any bias. The degree to which the human
can be less accurate but still contribute positively to
accuracy in combination with the algorithm depends on
the correlation between the predictions.
Notice that if the predictions become more negatively
correlated, an even less accurate human still results in a
hybrid pair that exceeds the accuracy of the algorithm
alone. From the previous equation, we have
2Bias(h) · Bias(c) + Bias(h)2 + Var(h) + 2Cov(h, c) <
3Bias(c)2 + 3Var(c).

It follows that a simple average of the human and the
algorithm will be more accurate if and only if
Var(h) + 2Cov(h, c) < 3Var(c). Given this insight, we can
then derinve analog of the Three Times Better Rule to
include covariance.
Two to Six Rule: If the algorithm and human’s
covariance lies between minus one-quarter and onequarter of the human variance, then the algorithm alone
cannot be more accurate than an average of the human
and the algorithm if the algorithm is only twice as
accurate as the human, and the algorithm alone must be
more accurate than the simple average if the algorithm
is more than six times as accurate.
Recall from our analysis using interpreted signals that
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the more diverse the data that humans and algorithms use
and the more different their models, the more likely they
make negatively correlated predictions. If we take the
degree of correlation as a proxy for the difference
between humans and algorithms, that is, if we assume
that thick data human predictions differ markedly from
big data algorithmic predictions, then a hybrid prediction
could outperform the algorithm even if the human were
four or five times less accurate.
Moreover, if we relax the assumption of equal
weighting and allow less weight on the less accurate
human predictor, then the weighted average of the
human and the algorithm will always be more accurate
than the algorithm alone. However, as we place less
weight on the human, we reduce the contribution of the
human to collective accuracy. Even though thick data
always add predictive accuracy under weighted
averaging, it may add very little.
To see how little the human might add, assume that the
human and the algorithm make independent predictions.
In this case, the optimal weighting of the two predictions
corresponds to their relative accuracies, that is, the
optimal weightings on the algorithm and the human
equal

Θ
and
1+Θ

1
, respectively. With these
1+Θ

weightings, the expected squared error of the hybrid
equals
(
)2 
 Θc + h
 ΘVar(c)

E 
− V  =
,
1+Θ
(1 + Θ)

which equals

Θ
times the expected error of the
Θ+1

algorithm.
Thus, given independent predictions, the expected
squared error from a weighted combination of a human
and an algorithm will always be less than the expected
squared error of the algorithm alone. However, as is clear
from the expression, the contribution of the human
decreases in the relative accuracy of the algorithm. And,
as discussed at length earlier, larger datasets and more
powerful algorithms surely mean that Θ, the relative
accuracy of the algorithm increases. And, yet, if we take
the calculation above seriously, people remain relevant.
Even if the computer algorithm was ten times as accurate
as the human, the human would increase accuracy by
nine percent, a non trivial amount.
The accuracy-correlation effect suggests that the
independence assumption may be problematic. The

weights to place on the human and the algorithm should
therefore be adjusted to take into account covariance.
The optimal weighting on the algorithm and the human,
(wc , wh ), are given by the following expression[33]:
(

)
ΘVar(c) − Cov(h, c)
Var(c) − Cov(h, c)
,
.
(1 + Θ)Var(c) − 2Cov(h, c) (1 + Θ)Var(c) − 2Cov(h, c))

It follows that the expected squared error given the
optimal weighting is given by the following expression:
ΘVar(c) · Var(c) − Cov(h, c)2
.
(1 + Θ)Var(c) − 2Cov(h, c)

Taking into account positive correlation places even
less weight on the human. Of course, if correlation was
negative, the human would get relatively more weight.
The fact that the weight on the human decreases in
both the accuracy of the algorithm and in the correlation
between algorithm and human implies that both parts of
the accuracy-correlation effect reduce the contribution
of the human predictor. In addition, accuracy and
correlation have an interactive effect, thus further
reducing the weight on the human predictor. To show
this, we first work through an example and then create
a parametrized family to show the shape of the effect.
Assume that Var(h) = 6, Var(c) = 3 ( Θ = 2), and
Cov(h, c) = −1. The optimal weights on the algorithm and
7
4
and . The expected squared error of
11
11
17
an optimally weighted hybrid group equals
, a
11

the human are

reduction of just under 50%. Next, assume that the
correlation switches from negative one to positive threefourths. The optimal weights on the algorithm and the
human become
grows to

93
.
40

7
3
and , and the hybrid’s squared error
10
10

Weight on Human, Hybrid Accuracy Improvement:
Low Algorithm Accuracy
Θ=2
Cov(h, c) = −1 ,
Cov(h, c) = 0.75 ,

(36%, 48%);
(30%, 23%).

High Algorithm Accuracy
Θ=6
Cov(h, c) = −1 ,
Cov(h, c) = 0.75 ,

(22%, 44%);
(5%, 1%).

Now, assume that better data make the algorithm three
times as accurate, so that Var(c) = 1. Assume that the
correlation remains at negative one. The optimal weights
become

7
2
5
and with an expected squared error of .
9
9
9
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Finally, consistent with the accuracy-correlation
effect, assume that when the algorithm becomes three
times as accurate that the covariance switches from
negative one to positive three-fourths: Var(h) = 6,
Var(c) = 1, and Cov(h, c) = 0.75. This implies that Θ = 6
and the optimal weights on the algorithm and human
equal

21
1
and .
22
22

In this last scenario, the weight attached to the human
falls below 5%. The expected squared error of the
weighted average of the algorithm and the human equals
87
, a negligible improvement over the algorithm alone.
88

To see the magnitude of the interaction. If the effects
were independent, the improvement on accuracy would
1
7

be , or approximately 14%. Instead, due to the positive
correlation, adding the human only increases accuracy
by 1%.
To capture how the accuracy-correlation effect
diminishes the contribution of human predictors more
generally, we create a parametric family of algorithmic
predictors. We first set Var(h) = 9, and let Θ, the relative
accuracy advantage of the algorithm, lie in the
interval[1, 9] . To embed the accuracy-correlation effect,
we assume that the covariance takes the following form:
Cov(h, c) =

Θ−5
. We can then plot the reduction in
8

squared error from adding the human and creating an
optimal hybrid group. Recall that as Θ increases from 1
to 9, the squared error of the algorithm reduces from 9 to
1. We should therefore expect the absolute reduction in
squared error to decrease. As shown in Fig. 6 , the
percentage reduction falls markedly as Θ increases
because of the accuracy-correlation effect.
3.3

Predictability from data and atypical events

5

50

4

40

3

30

Percentage reduction
in squared error

20

2

10

1

Percentage reduction
in squared error (%)

Squared error reduction

The cases we have considered so far assume that the big

Squared error reduction
0

Fig. 6
to 9.

1

2

3

4

5
Θ

6

7

8

9

0

Contribution of human: Var(h)= 9, Θ ranges from 1
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data are relevant to the predictive context. As discussed
earlier, past data may not be of much use in predicting
an outcome for a large change to a system such as an
external shock or an attribute taking on an extreme value.
Past data may also be of limited use when predicting the
implications of a novel decision or strategic move. In
these instances, humans may be more accurate than
algorithms given the human capacities to draw analogies
and to imagine alternative futures.
To make the choice to use a human rather than an
algorithm requires being able to classify a prediction as
atypical as opposed to predictable from data. The
amount by which humans can improve accuracy on
atypical events depends on how often atypical events
must occur, how accurately they can be recognized, and
on the relative accuracy of humans in those cases.
Ironically, identifying the set of atypical cases is itself
a predictive task. The more transparent the algorithm, the
better the human can predict that the algorithm is making
a large mistake. Thus, as algorithmic performance
improves, making algorithmic predictions more
interpretable becomes more important[34].
As already noted, deciding to abandon the algorithm
involves a prediction that the case is atypical. And,
whether abandoning is statistically supported depends
on the accuracy of that prediction in a way that can be
made precise. We restrict attention here to what we see
as the most relevant case, that is in which the algorithm
is more accurate than the human in the predictable region,
and the human is more accurate than the algorithm in the
atypical region.
Recall from Fig. 5 , we need to consider four
possibilities: (1) instances thought to be predictable from
big data that are predictable, (2) instances thought to be
predictable from big data that are atypical
(ErrorAtypical ), (3) instances thought to be atypical which
are atypical, and (4) instances thought to be atypical
which are predictable given big data (ErrorPredict).
If we assume the accuracy-correlation effect, the
human predictor receives little weight in the hybrid
prediction. Thus, the accuracy of hybrid prediction will
be approximately the same as the algorithm’s alone.
Therefore, in the predictable region minus ErrorPredict,
hybrid prediction will be, to first approximation, the
algorithm’s prediction. The same is true for instances
thought to be predictable that turn out to be atypical
(region ErrorAtypical ). Whether or not to abandon the
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algorithm therefore hinges on the relative accuracies of
the human and the algorithm in regions ErrorPredict and
the atypical region minus ErrorAtypical , the instances
classified as predictable but that are actually atypical.
In the region ErrorPredict outcomes are predictable
given big data, and the human has a squared error equal
to Θ times that of the algorithm. In that region, the human
makes the prediction, which is a mistake. In the atypical
region minus ErrorAtypical , the human also makes the
prediction alone. In these cases, that is the correct
decision. Whether abandoning the algorithm improves
accuracy depends on the size of those regions relative to
the sizes of predictive errors as stated below.
The Ratio Rule: If the ratio of correctly identified
atypical cases to incorrectly identified atypical cases
exceeds the ratio of the product of algorithmic advantage,
Θ, and algorithmic error on predictable cases to the
product of human advantage on atypical cases Ψ , and
human error on atypical cases, then letting humans
predict cases identified as atypical reduces expected
squared error iff the following holds,
Prob(Atypical − ErrorAtypical ) (Θ − 1)Var(cP )
>
.
Prob(ErrorPredict )
(Ψ − 1)Var(hA )

If, for example, humans are ten times as accurate as the
algorithm on atypical cases Ψ = 10, and algorithms are
four times as accurate as humans on predictable cases,
Θ = 4. If human error on atypical cases, Var (hA ) equals
two times Var (cP ), then human need only be one-sixth
as likely to correctly classify as an atypical case as it is
to incorrectly classify a predictable case.

4

Discussion and Conclusion

We have presented an analysis of how humans and
algorithms can jointly make better predictions than
either alone in many instances. By taking a theoretical
approach guided by empirical evidence, at the moment,
hybrid groups should perform better than algorithms
alone. So far as humans rely on thicker data than
computers, they add more accuracy, and if there exists
atypical events and even a crude ability to recognize
them, humans could improve accuracy by reducing
mistakes. This has the added advantage of building faith
in hybrid predictors, and, counter-intuitively, in
algorithms. By not allowing algorithms to make big
mistakes, faith in algorithms increases.
Our formal analysis has considered a rather small
crowd – one human and one algorithm. If we allow
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groups of people with exposure to different types of thick
data and diverse algorithms (random forests and neural
networks) based on different caches of data, both what
we call the human and the algorithm would improve. Our
entire analysis of a single human and a single algorithm
could then be reinterpreted as representing a crowd of
humans and an ensemble of algorithms with some
caveats. With a group of humans, we might be able to
further divide the atypical cases. Subject matter experts
or specialists could be more accurate for specific atypical
cases.
The question of whether humans will continue to be
of value when making contributions merits deeper
consideration. Continual technological advancements
make datasets larger and larger and algorithms more
sophisticated enabling algorithms to make increasingly
accurate forecasts and classifications. Assuming there
are only modest changes and improvements to how
people predict, one could infer that the contributions of
humans measured quantitatively would wane, with the
caveat that we would still add value in atypical cases.
That line of thinking implies the necessity of greater
interpretability of algorithmic predictions so that we can
better predict the atypical. That will surely be the case.
As implied by our formalism, if enhancing
interpretability reduces misclassification of predictable
and atypical instances, then it will yield significant
increases in accuracy. It also follows that hybrid groups
may be implemented more as an “or” than an “and,” by
which we mean we may use AI in some cases and
humans in others.
We believe these conclusions suffer from a failure to
take into account human and AI’s adaptive capacities.
First, recall that humans and AI differ in the information
we can process, how we represent it, and how we derive
predictions. Thus, we should not think of humans and
AI as doing the same thing when making predictions.
Second, humans learned to make predictions without AI
as a potential partner. We develop protocols for how to
predict with an eye toward improving individual
accuracy through noise and bias reduction.
Those skills will remain useful, but they surely differ
from the skills that would best complement AI. Through
adaptation, humans can complement algorithms
regardless of how wide and deep big data become. We
can do so by learning to gather types of thick data and
types of models that are accurate where the algorithms
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fail. We can think of how humans predict as the outcome
of a cooperative game. Algorithm developers build the
largest possible dataset and an ensemble of predictive
models. Humans then explore and contemplate missing
attributes or seek to identify conditions in which AI may
fail. In the future, humans may well specialize on
atypical cases – a form of adaptation to the algorithm.
Overall, so long as humans can continue to identify
different attributes, that is, continue to construct thicker
data, or better understand atypical cases, they will
continue to increase accuracy.
The cooperative game framing also reveals that
algorithm designers should take into account the
capacities of human predictive collaborators. The
optimal algorithms to be part of a hybrid group might
differ from algorithms design to make predictions
without the aid of humans. Higher order algorithms may
well guide humans as to what thick data they might
gather by pointing to regions of low predictive
confidence or limited interpretability. Rather than a
competition between humans and computers, the future
of hybrid predictors will be a complex search for
symbiosis. The particulars cannot be known, but we can
almost certainly predict that the roles and contributions
of the participants will both adapt to ever growing data
and greater computational power.

assumptions, Var(hP ) = ΘVar(cP ) and
Var(cA ) =
Ψ Var(hA ). To simplify notation, let E P and E A denote the
regions ErrorPredict and ErrorAtypical . For large values of
Θ, it follows that the hybrid–deference rule will have a
lower expected squared error than an algorithm alone
provided that Prob(E P )Var(cP ) + Prob(Atypical − E A )
Var(cA ) exceeds Prob(E P )Var(hP ) + Prob(Atypical−E A )
Var(hA ). This can be simplified as

Appendix

[2]

Proof of Half the Distance Rule: Write the Diversity
Prediction Theorem for n = 2 using h and c as the two
predictions. This gives the following expression:
(
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